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1. Introduction
Recent articles have discussed the idea of corruption as a cultural phenomenon
1; bribery is the
result of the cultural attitudes of a people, a sort of institutionalized behaviour matured as time
goes by and affecting more and more individuals. In this case particular attention must be
devoted to studying the mechanisms of cultural transmission from one generation to the next.
The concept of “frequency dependent equilibria” illustrates and explains this cultural
mechanism. In other words with the increase in the number of corrupt people, honest individuals
are induced to adopt corruption; thus, future generations will be more corrupt if levels of
corruption were very high in the past (see Sah, 1988; Andvig-Moene, 1990; Andvig, 1991).
Whereas in more recent models a specific cultural mechanism is introduced: in Tirole (1996)
for example, reputation of past generations affects the behaviour of future generations, while in
Hauk-Marti (1999) adults educates children  following an education process based on the
hypothesis of imperfect empathy, by which parents can perceive the welfare of their children
only through the filter of their own preferences (Bisin-Verdier, 1998, 2000a,b, 2001a,b). An
important implication of this model is that government can affect the distribution of ethics in the
population and reduce corruption by announcing a time consistent policy of reforms or exerting
an educational effort on new generations. According to the authors, these facts would explain
the success of Hong-Kong’s anti-corruption measures.
However, could this approach solve the problem of corruption in less developed countries
where endemic poverty tragically affects the behaviour of both individuals and institutions? We
want to answer this question by reversing the usual approach used in economic theory; that is,
as literature  consider corruption a factor inhibiting development by affecting investment and
productivity( Mauro, 1995; Gupta-Davoodi-Tiogson, 2000; Tanzi-Davoodi, 1997; Gupta-
Davoodi-Terme, 1998), we wish to consider the reversed proposal that underdevelopment
creates the necessary condition for endemic corruption
2.
 In fact a perpetual scarcity of public goods/services produces distortions of an individual’s
attitudes towards the cost of bureaucratic procedures: even if bureaucracy is not cumbersome,
poverty induces people to percieve honesty as too expensive and prefer illegal payments
because they cannot completely satisfy their needs following the legal bureaucratic procedures
3.
 To theoretically prove our hypothesis we have organised the article as follow: in the first part
we propose a bureaucratic game in which clients (agents) and bureaucrats exchange public
goods and services. The game has the structure of a signalling game, where agents have to
manifest their attitudes towards corruption. There are only two possible types of agents:
potentially honest and potentially dishonest. They differ from one another in the perception of
transaction costs related to bureauctratic procedures. Corrupt people perceive these costs as
very high an so honesty is never their dominant strategy.
                                                          
1 Corruption is typically defined as the abuse of public power for private benefit. In this article we will
always refer to this definition, emphasizing the attention on corruption of public officials (bureaucratic
corruption).
2 A similar approach is in Leite-Weidman (1999), where resource abundance creates opportunities for
those seeking illicit income and is an important factor in determining a country’s level of corruption.
3 Scarcity and poverty also increase bureaucratic power; bureaucrats can select the demand by arbitrarily
increasing the price of goods/services they “sell” imposing the payment of a bribe (see Slaifher-Visny
1993 and Tanzi 1998).2
  Conversely, honest agents have moral attitudes implying a strong preference for honest
transactions; only low costs of corruption could lead them to choose bribery
4. So, according to
our approach, bureaucratic costs will be perceived as higher in less developed countries.
A second part introduces the dynamic mechanisms delineating the evolution of social
preferences. Individuals “produce” this evolution by trying to transmit their personal attitudes to
their children (vertical transmission). On the other hand, the child can assume the preferences of
a different randomly chosen agent if the parent’s education effort fails (oblique transmission).
Parents evaluate their child’s welfare as if it were their own (imperfect emphaty) and choose
an educational effort that defines the probability with which the parent’s cultural trait is adopted
by the child. Moreover a further hypothesis is introduced: we suppose that a honest (corrupt)
parent believes a corrupt (honest) child will always choose corruption (honesty)
5. This particular
hypothesis is crucial in the analysis.
The evolution of social preferences will depend strictly on the equilibria of bureaucratic game;
moreover each equilibrium is connected to a particular level of corruption costs. Then we
introduce a vote mechanism by which population selects an optimal level of such costs
(institutions
6); clearly, this choice will depend on the distribution of agent’s preferences, i.e. a
majority of corrupt agents will vote for lower corruption costs and vice versa. Therefore, as in
Bisin-Verdier (2000), there is a two-way causality between both culture and political outcomes:
distribution of preferences affects the choice of corruption costs (political outcomes), but such
costs are crucial to define the behaviour of agents (in the bureaucratic game) and consequently
the evolution of cultural traits themselves.
The main results of our analysis emphasize the existence of two distinct situations:
a) Developed countries, characterized by weak perception of bureaucratic costs: corruption
can be permanently reduced by inducing optimistic expectations on future corruption levels and
political reforms or by public education campaigns; b) Less developed countries, with a tragic
perception of bureaucratic costs: efficacious political reforms are blocked; we can only
temporarely reduce corruption by public education campaigns. When campaigns are interrupted,
distribution of social preferences will always converge towards a majority of corrupt people. In
this case corruption is endemic: we call this situation the corruption trap
7.
Finally, we empirically corroborate the model’s implications in a cross-country framework,
using both corruption indeces and a new data-set which measures the population’s expectation
of future corruption for each country.
                                                          
4 Theoretically each type could have convenience to manifest a behaviour in contrast with her real
attitude. For example, this convenience could derive from excessively permissive institutional rules
making honesty more costly than corruption and inducing potentially honest people to prefer manifesting
scarce corruption aversion.
5 In Hauk-Marti, honest people (corrupt) are always honest (corrupt); we shift this rigidity on the agent’s
belief.
6 By institutions we intend all formal and informal rules defining the costs of corruption. See North
(1990) for a more detailed description.
7 Like in the prisoner’s dilemma, the corruption trap is an inefficient equilibrium solution of the game
where honesty is, in evolutionary terms, a dominated strategy and individuals playing such strategy tends
to disappear. In the long-run population will be esclusivally composed by dishonest individuals.3
2. Bureaucratic Game
Transaction between bureaucrat and client (agent) is modelled like a signalling game (see
figure 1). Agents are defined in two types:  {} 2 1,t t T = . With  1 t  indicating a potentially corrupt
individual and with  2 t a potentially honest individual. The probability of an agent being corrupt
is  {} t z t prob = 1 .
 Clients know their types (complete information) and send a message which manifest their
attitude to corruption. With the message  1 m  agent manifests the will to be corrupt, while with
2 m he shows strong aversion for corruption. Theoretically, an agent can send a message in
contrast with his true nature.
Bureaucrats are supposedly neutral, that is they have no natural inclination to honesty or
corruption; they will simply observe the message and choose the strategy (corruption or
honesty) with the higher payoff. The strategy set of bureaucrat changes according to the
message observed. When the message is  1 m , the bureaucrat can reject the agent’s proposal (r)
or accept it, choosing corruption (c). Instead, with  2 m he has to decide between honesty (h) and
corruption (c); but, in the second case, bribery depends on the final agent’s acceptance (a) or
rejection (r) (see the further decisional node of agents at the right and side of the game, after
bureaucrat has chosen corruption).
When corruption is the equilibrum strategy of all players (left hand side of the game), the
agent’s payoff is () θ − − i B U  with U  the revenue the agent obtains from the public
good/service ) 0 ( > U ,  i B  the bribe he pays after he has sent a message  i m   () 2 , 1 = i  and θ  the
cost of corruption  ) 0 ( ≥ θ
8. The bureaucrat’s payoff has the form () θ − i B . When corruption is
adopted with a client of type  1 t  manifesting scarce aversion to corruption ( 1 m ), the cost of
corruption reduces to  θ a  with  1 0 ≤ ≤ a ; “complicity” between bureaucrat and client limits the
risk of illegal transaction. This “complicity” is absent with types  2 t  and when the message is
2 m : in this case players pay the full cost of corruption.
                                                          
8 By cost of corruption we intend all costs resulting from punishments (arrest, dismissal, fine etc.)
inflicted to a corrupt individual when his illegal behaviour is detected. Of course we implicitly consider
the efficiency of monitoring technology such that the stronger  monitoring activity the higher corruption
costs.4
Considering the left hand side of the game, when the bureaucrat rejects the bribe  1 B  proposed
by the agent he gains a payoff of zero; the client does not obtain the public good/service and so
he pays a cost () U − . Note that when agents manifest scarce aversion to corruption, honesty is
not a possible choice of bureaucrat; simply, if the bureaucrat want to act onestly, he will reject
the proposal of the client. Contrarily, with message  2 m bureaucrat can opt for honesty, gaining
zero or choose corruption by requiring the payment of a bribe  2 B . Rejecting this proposal the
agent does not obtain the public good/service and pays a cost () U −  while the bureaucrat’s
payoff is the full corruption cost () θ − .
An important hypothesis is that considering the “cost of honesty” for corrupt agents () W :
imagine each agent plays  2 m  then, if bureaucrat chooses honesty, agent of type  1 t  pays a cost
() W −  while the honest agent obtains the revenue () U . The idea is that using the normal
bureaucratic procedure (that is, working honestly) could produce very high costs for corrupt
agents because of four factors:
1)  They would not have access to public good/service in time;
2)  They would not have the quantity of the desired public good/service;
3)  They would not have exclusive access to public good/service;
4)  They cannot “buy” (paying a bribe) the right to use the public good/service (in the case the
agent has no rights).
Thus we can consider W as the cost of bureaucratic procedure as perceived by corrupt agents.
The hypothesis is that honest people does not pay attention to these costs and honesty is the best
result for them. On the other hand, corrupt individuals are strongly aware to these costs, and so
they always prefer corruption. However, as we see later, honest agents could prefer to manifest
scarce corruption aversion if the cost of corruption is very low and bureauctrats are induced to
choose bribery independently of the agent’s strategy.
Clearly, it is reasonable to suppose high values of W when public goods/services are scarce
and institutions do not work well, i.e. when we have a low level of economic and institutional
development.5
2.1 Equilibria
Before studying the game’s equilibria we have to make some considerations about the
definition of bribe level  2 B . We can observe that when the message is  2 m bureaucrats choose
corruption only if they are sure the agent accepts it. So the illegal transaction requires a level of
bribe  2 B  so that  U B U − ≥ − −θ 2 : riarranging this espression and considering only the
equality, we obtain the maximum bribe both type of agents are willing to pay when they play
2 m :  θ − = U B 2 2 . At this point the payoff structure at the right hand side of the game becomes
as shown in figure 2.
Now it is easy to show that the sole equilibria are () ( ) () [] a c c m m Pooling , , , , 1 1  when  θ > U  and
() ( ) [] h c m m Separatig , , , 2 1  when θ < U . We analyze these possibilities in turn
9.
(1)  () ( ) () [] a c c m m Pooling , , , , 1 1 : both types of agents manifest scarce corruption aversion
(playing  1 m ). Bureaucrats can accept this proposal but they require a bribe  1 B  so that their
expected payoff is positive: () ( ) ( ) 0 1 1 1 > − − + − z B z a B θ θ . From this condition the agent
obtain the minum bribe the bureaucrat is willing to accept:  () () a z B − − = 1 1 1 θ
10. Given this
equilibrium bribe and the initial condition  θ > U , we have to investigate whether at least one
agent would benefit from deviation. Deviating, both types of agents obtain () U −  because the
bureaucrat chooses corruption (see figure 2), but deviation is an optimal strategy for type  1 t only
if  () () U a a z U − < − − − −θ θ 1 1  and for type  2 t only if  () () U a z U − < − − − −θ θ 1 1 . Given the
initial hypothesis  θ > U , these conditions are not satisfied; so playing  1 m  is the dominant
strategy for both types of agents.
(2) () ( ) [] h c m m Separatig , , , 2 1 : with  θ < U  the bureaucrat “plays” honesty when observing a
signal  2 m . Then, the honest agent can obtain a payoff  0 > U  playing  2 m  while the corrupt
agent keeps playing  1 m  because honesty has a cost W and by hypothesis we suppose
W a B U − > − −θ 1
11; we can conclude that no agent deviates from this equilibrium. Reversing
this relation, i.e. with  W a B U − < − −θ 1 , we can have a further pooling equilibrium, where all
agents play  2 m  and buraucrats choose honesty. Such hypothesis is not considered because it
implies the unrealistic situation of the absence of bureaucratic corruption. Empirical evidence,
in fact, shows that no country is exempt from corruption although corruption levels vary widely
across countries (see Klitgaard, 1988; Hauk-Marti, 1999).
                                                          
9 The notation  () ( ) [] n n m m ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ , , ,  means that types  1 t  and  2 t  play respectively m′and  m′ ′  while the
bureaucrat chooses n′  if he observes a message m′ and n′ ′ if the message is m′ ′ .
10 Minimum bribe is defined such that the bureaucrat is indifferent between accept or reject it. Precisely,
the agent offers this minimum bribe plus a quantity  0 ≈ ε . For simplicity this quantity is omitted.
11 With separating equilibrium bureaucrat knows that  1 m  is played only by the agent  1 t ; then, the
minimum bribe he accepts is  θ a B = 1 .6
However  we cannot totally  exclude momentary situations where the above relation is satisfied.
This can occur when the cost of corruption (θ ) tragically and exogenously increases
(institutional shock) inducing even corrupt people to prefer honesty. The Italian “revolution” of
“mani pulite” (clean hands) is an example of such institutional shock. We will discuss this in
section 7.
Summarizing, a very low cost of corruption, such that  θ > U , implies an increse of
bureaucratic power; in this situation bureaucrats prefer corruption even if agents manifest
bribery aversion, inducing the honest to play  1 m , against their true nature.
Differently, when  θ < U , a “portion” of society begins to express uneasiness: as we will see
later, this has important implications on the evolutionary dynamics of population cultural traits.
From now on we label with  1 θ  and  2 θ  different levels of corruption cost so that rispectively
θ > U  and  θ < U . We also suppose that in normal conditions the cost of corruption has a
“natural” upper boundary θ  (we can consider θ  as defined by technological limits in detecting
corruption). However in section 7 we consider the hypothesis of a traumatic increase of θ , due
to exogenous institutional shocks that do not depend on the voting mechanism. In that case we
cannot exclude the possibility to have  W a B U − < − −θ 1 , even if we consider it as transitory.
3. Dynamics of social preferences
3.1 Imperfect emphaty
Now we expand the model adding the temporal dimension and considering an overlapping
generational mechanism by which parents and society transmit cultural traits to future
generations. To do it we consider each agent (client) living two periods. In the first period
he/she is a child and he/she has no specific preferences; in the second he/she becomes an adult
with a definite attitude against corruption, plays the bureaucratic game and has a child (so that
population is constant). Preferences are transmitted to the child by the education effort of the
parent (vertical transmission) and by the cultural influence of society (oblique transmission): if7
the child does not learn from the parent, he/she adopts the preferences of a randomly chosen
adult.
 Parents want to maximize their child’s future well-being, but they evaluate the welfare of
their childs through their own preferences structure according to the hypothesis of imperfect
empathy. Empathy is the psychological process that consists in directly absorbing the emotional
condition of another person; the imperfection we attribute to this process consists in a sort of
myopic behaviour of a parent who evaluates the future choices of his child without considering
the child’s effective attitude but exclusively using the one’s own. Moreover we suppose that
each type of agent has a specific belief about the message the opposite type normally sends.
Precisely, it is supposed that a type  i t  is convinced that an agent  j t  always sends a message
j m , with  j i ≠ .
Then, indicating with  ) , , ( b m t k i Π  the payoff a type  i t   () 2 , 1 = i  obtains when he sends the
message  k m  () 2 , 1 = k  and the bureaucrat chooses b, and with  ( ) k
j i V θ
,  the expected utility from
the economic action of a child of type  j t   () 2 , 1 = j  as percieved by a parent of type  i t  when he
expects a corruption cost  k θ  () 2 , 1 = k , we can state the following formal definition of imperfect
emphaty:
- Definition -
 Imperfect emphaty:  1) for the type  1 t ,  () b m t V , , 2 1
2 , 1 Π =  with the belief that
() b m t m , , max arg 2 2 Π = ,  {} h c b , ∈ ; 2) for the type  2 t ,  () b m t V ′ Π = , , 1 2
1 , 2  with the belief that
() b m t m ′ Π = , , max arg 1 1 ,  {} r c b , ∈ ′ .
3.2 The educational process
At time t each adult of type  i t  () 2 , 1 = i  has a child and chooses an effort 
i
t τ  to educate him.
This effort is the probability the child will adopt parent’s preferences ( ) 1 0 ≤ ≤




,  the probability that a child of parent  i t  is of type  j t  and considering a corrupt adult, we
can write
( )
() () t t t
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Given these probabilities, we can characterize the dynamic behaviour of  t z :
()
1 , 2 1 , 1
1 1 t t t t t P z P z z − + = +
substituting 
1 , 1
t P  and 
1 , 2
t P  we obtain
() ( ). 1
2 1
1 t t t t t t z z z z τ τ − − + = + .
 As we can see, the dynamic of population’s preferences depends on the parent’s educational
effort. Precisely, a parent of type  i t  chooses the educational effort  [] 1 , 0 ∈ τ  that maximizes










t C V P V P τ θ θ β − + = Γ
, , , ,
where  β  is the discount rate and  () t C τ  the cost of educational effort. We assume that  ( )
i C τ
is twice continuosly differentiable and strictly convex with  () 0 0 = C ,  () 0 0 = ′ C  and that for all
τ  0 > ′ > ′ ′ C C
12. In order to assess 
j i V
,  a parent of type  i t  uses his own payoff structure
(imperfect emphaty), therefore we must have  ( ) ( ) k
j i
k
i i V V θ θ
, , ≥ .
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∂
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∂
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12 Note that  () τ C  must be sufficiently convex such that the solution of the maximization problem is
1 < τ .9
The educational effort of type  1 t  decreases as the proportion of corrupt agents increases. In
fact, higher values of z mean a higher probability the child assumes the same preferences as the
parent simply by socializing with a member of society; this induces the parent to reduce the
educational effort. For the same argument, if the proportion of corrupt agents increases, the
honest parents must intensify their educationl effort.
4. The choice of institutions
Given the subjective nature of  “bureaucratic procedure cost” W (it depends on the corrupt
agents’ perception) we can consider the “corruption cost” θ  as the main parameter describing
institutional efficency
13. Moreover, from the bureaucratic game we note that each type of agent
has an exact preference about the level of this parameter: type  1 t  (the corrupt agent) prefers a
low level of corruption cost such that  θ > U  because he would obtain a payoff
() () 2 1 2 2 θ θ− > − U U  while type  2 t  (the honest agent) wants  θ < U  to realise a payoff
()( ) 1 2θ − > U U
14. Then we can suppose that in each period adults have to decide the degree of
institutional efficency by voting the preferred level of θ . If the fraction  t z  of individuals of
type  1 t  is larger than  2
1 , then corrupt agents have the majority and they will vote for a  1 θ  such
that  θ > U . On the other hand when  t z  is less than  2
1 , the level of θ  will be decided by honest
agents and they will vote for a  2 θ  such that  θ < U .

























The vote mechanism we have introduced allow us to formalise the idea that corruption spreads
when there is not sufficient social aversion to it.
5. The steady states
We can now characterize the steady states according to the expected corruption costs.
Lemma 1
1)  if  1 θ θ=
e  then  0
1 > τ ,  0
2 = τ ;
2)  if  2 θ θ=
e  then 
2 1 τ τ <
>  when 
* z zt >
<
                                                          
13 Of course, the cost W also depends on the level of redtape, but in this context we esclusively emphasize
the role of agent’s perceptions.
14 We can say that honest and corrupt agents prefer rispectively separating and pooling equilibrium.10
where  ( ) ( )















θ θ θ θ
θ θ







1) When agents expect a corruption cost  1 θ , the equilibrium of bureaucratic game is pooling
and each type plays  1 m . Given the imperfect empathy hypothesis we have that
( ) ( ) 1
2 , 1
1
1 , 1 θ θ θ θ= > =
e e V V  and  ( ) ( ) 1
1 , 2
1
2 , 2 θ θ θ θ= = =
e e V V ; consequently, by the first
order condition (f.o.c.) of parent’s maximization problem,  0
1 > τ ,  0
2 = τ .
2) When the expected cost is  2 θ , separating equilibrium in bureaucratic game and imperfect
emphaty assure that  ( ) ( ) 2
2 , 1
2
1 , 1 θ θ θ θ= > =
e e V V  and  ( ) ( ) 2
1 , 2
2
2 , 2 θ θ θ θ= > =
e e V V ; by f.o.c.
each type of agent chooses a positive educational effort,  0
1 > τ  and  0
2 > τ . To obtain the point
* z we have to consider that 
2 1 τ τ>  implies  ( ) ( )
2 1 τ τ C C ′ > ′ . Then  ( )()( )z z









j i i i i V V − = ∆ , 2 , 1 , = j i  and  j i ≠ .
Corollary:  By  () ( ) W U − − − = ∆ 2
1 2θ  and  () ( ) 2














: if corrupt agents have a very adverse perception of bureaucratic
procedure costs () +∞ → W e i ., .  then 
* z  “converges” to 1.
Proposition 1: Suppose that  2
1 * < z  and  W U − > − θ 2 . Then there exists a unique  2
1 > z  and
2
1 ˆ < z  such that: 1) if  z z > 0  then for all t,  t z  converges monotonically to 1; 2) if  z z z < < 0 ˆ
then for all t, either  t z  converges monotonically to 1 or  t z  converges to 
* z ; 3) if  z z ˆ 0 <  and
z z ˆ
* <  then  t z  converge to 
* z ;  4)  if  z z ˆ 0 <  and  2
1 * ˆ < < z z  then either  t z  converges
monotonically to 1 or  t z  converges to 
* z .
(Proof. See appendix)
When type  2 t  individuals are in a small enough minority () z z e i > 0 ., . , whatever their
socialisation effort, they will always remain in minority in the next generation. This means that
each agent’s rational expectation is  1 θ θ =
e ; so by lemma 1 only agents of type  1 t will choose a
positive educational effort ( ) 0
1 > τ  and population will converge monotonically to 1. On the
other hand when type  2 t  individuals are in a sufficently high majority () z z e i ˆ ., . 0 <  they will
remain in majority also in the next period, inducing all agents to expect  2 θ θ =
e  and, by lemma
1, to choose a positive effort; the population will converge to a uniquely stable steady state
* z z =  if  z z ˆ
* <  (see appendix). On the other hand, when  2
1 * ˆ < < z z  we have equilibria with
self-fulfilling expectations: once  2
1 ˆ < < t z z , expectations of agents will be confirmed. Suppose11
population is in 
* z  and agents expect  2 θ θ=
e . Then, by lemma 1, 
2 1 τ τ =  and population
remains in  2
1 * < z  self-confirming the initial expectations. Differently, if  1 θ θ=
e  by lemma 1
only corrupt agents choose a positive effort, and population moves toward 1; given that
2
1 * ˆ < < z z , then    2
1 *
1 ) ( > + z zt  and this of course self-confirms the initial expectations. By the
same arguments we have self-fulfilling expecations when  z z < < 0 2
1 .
Proposition 2 (corruption trap): Suppose that  2
1 * > z  and  W U − > −θ 2 . Then for all t,  t z
converges monotonically to 1.
(Proof. See appendix)
When corrupt agents have a tragic perception of the costs of bureaucratic procedures
( ) 2
1 * ., . > z e i , population dynamics always move towards lower proportion of honest agents
() 2
1 ., . > t z e i . Honesty has a very high cost for types  1 t  and they will tend to choose an higher
effort  ( )
2 1 ., . τ τ> e i  when 
*
0 z z < . On the other hand, with 
*
0 z z >  the optimal effort of types
2 t  does not allow to reach a  2
1 < t z . Then corrupt agents will always have majority in the
process of institutional choice, and the population will converge to 1.
 We call this situation “the corruption trap” because sooner or later, whatever the initial point
0 z , the dynamics of population will reach a proportion of corrupt agents ables to affect the
process of institutional choice. When this occurs, expectations will always be  1 θ θ=
e  and even
honest agents will prefer to manifest scarce aversion to corruption, playing  1 m  and not
bothering to educate their children ( ) 0
2 = τ . In such sense we can note the strict analogy
between typical externality in public goods supply (free riding problem) and the corruption trap.
Efficient institutions can be considered as public goods and corruption the negative externality
obstructing a virtuous evolution of institutions, just as in the free riding problem where the free
rider creates conditions for an insufficient quantity of public good.
By propositions 1 and 2 we can state the same facts about cross country levels of corruption.
Precisely, less developed countries must show higher levels and homogeneity of corruption
indicators; on the other hand, by proposition 1, richer countries should experiment either high
level or low levels of corruption. Again, expectations of future corruption must appear as more
pessimistic in poorer than in richer countries. In section 8 we use avoilable data on cross
country corruption levels and population expectations to have a first confirmation of the
model’s predictions.
6. Exogenous education campaigns
In Hauk-Marti (1999), government can “solve” the problem of corruption adopting intensive
education campaigns and investing in moral education. Formally, it chooses a public effort  ρ  to
teach honest behaviour at school. “Similar to private education efforts, the public education12
effort represents the probability with which a child who did not learn from his parents adopts
honest preferences in school”.
As before, 
i τ  is the education effort of a parent of type  i t ; with probability ( )
i τ − 1  child
remains “naive” and in that case he again has a probability ρ  to assume preferences  2 t . With
probability  () ρ − 1 , public education fails and the child learns preferences from a randomly
choosen adult in the society.
Then we can rewrite the probabilities 
j i P
, :
( ) () ρ τ τ− − + = 1 1
1 1 1 , 1
t t t t z P ;
( )() () [] ρ ρ τ+ − − − = t t t z P 1 1 1
1 2 , 1
( )() () [] ρ ρ τ τ+ − − − + = 1 1 1
2 2 2 , 2
t t t t z P
( )() t t t z P ρ τ− − = 1 1
2 1 , 2 .
Consequently, maximization problem of parents becomes
max ( ) ( )
i j i j i
t
i i i i
t C V P V P F τ β− + =
, , , ,             2 , 1 , = j i
with first order conditions (f.o.c.)
() () () ()
1 2 , 1 1 , 1
1 1 1 0 τ ρ β
τ
C z V V




2 1 , 2 2 , 2
2 1 0 τ ρ β
τ
C z V V
F ′ = − − ⇒ =
∂
∂
The education effort of type  1 t  increases with  ρ  because the probability that a child assumes
different preferences is higher. On the other hand, the education effort of type  2 t  decreases
when  ρ  increases, because public education can compensate a lower effort made by honest
parents.
The dynamic equation becomes
( ) () () ( ) { } ρ τ ρ τ τ
2 2 1
1 1 1 1 t t t t t t t z z z z − − − − − = − + ;
where  0 = z  is a rest point while 1 = z  is a rest only if  0 = ρ ; interior solutions requires that
2 1 τ τ> . We need to find a level of ρ  which allows us to converge towards lower levels of
corruption. Such convergence is possible if
() () ( ) () () ( ) ( ) { } 0 1 1 1
2 2 1 < − − − − − ρ τ ρ τ τ z z z z t t t t13
Hauk-Marti show that with a  () 0
1 τ ρ>  population will converge to  0 = z
15.
This mechanism works well, producing permanent improvements in terms of diffused honesty,
when  2
1 * < z . It is sufficient to mantain a pubblic effort  ρ  until the population reaches a
z zt ˆ < ; at that point, the system automatically converges to 
* z  with higher corruption costs.
Problems arise when the population is in the “corruption trap”. By public effort, government
can move population preferences towards higher levels of honesty, but this effort must be
sustained permanently. When it is interrupted, infact, the population begins converging to 1
again. In this situation honesty is only a temporary state, relying solely on public effort. This
result is very important to study the problem of corruption in countries where individuals have a
strong aversion to bureaucratic costs (i.e.,  2
1 * > z ) and reforms
16 are obstructed by hostile social
and political attitudes: without a serious change in perception of bureaucratic costs, the
ideological education of new generations only costitutes a temporary solution to the problem of
corruption.
 Formally, we have to modify the perception of bureaucratic cost W, so that  2
1 * < z . This
perception is of course conditioned by the number of steps and permits in bureaucratic
procedures but it fundamentally depends on scarsity and essentiality of public goods/services, in
other words on the economic status of country. The removal of cumbersome red tape would not
significantly reduce W if poverty and scarsity are diffused; individuals would continue to enjoy
limited access to goods/services and perceive normal bureaucratic procedure as too expensive
even if it has been drastically reduced. This would explain the enormous difficulties in fighting
bribery in developing countries whereas lower levels of corruption are noted in richer
economies, even with a strong presence of bureaucracy in political and economic life.
7. Institutional shocks and the Italian experience
So far we have supposed that  W a B U − > − −θ 1 , with the result that corrupt agents never
prefer honesty to corruption. We justified this hypothesis by considering corrupt people as
having a tragic perception of bureaucratic costs. However, as we have mentioned above, we
cannot totally exclude momentary situations where the above relation is reversed. This can
occur when the cost of corruption (θ ) tragically and exogenously increases producing an
“institutional shock” and inducing even corrupt people to prefer honesty. According to the
Bureaucratic Game, when this occurs, we would have a further pooling equilibrium, with all
types of agents playing  2 m  and bureaucrat choosing honesty. Of course, this produce the
unrealistic situation of the total absence of corruption, but we consider it as purely momentary.
                                                          
15 From Hauk-Marti (1999): “Notice that if  1 = ρ  the system converges to  0 = z  although honest parents
do not educate their children at all. Hence, for  1 = ρ ,  0 < ∆z  for all  0 > z . By continuity, there exists a
ρ  such that for  ρ ρ >   0 < ∆z  for all  0 > z . Indeed it is easy to see that for  ) 0 (
1 τ ρ >   0 = z  is the
only attractor”.
16 By reforms we intend a significant increase in corruption costs such that  2 θ θ=
e .14
The Italian “revolution” of mani pulite was an important example of this type of institutional
shocks. In early ’90s a judicial enquiry into bureaucratic and political corruption revealed that
bribery was a diffused and endemic phenomenon in all aspects of institutional life. The
enormous scaldals produced  an immediate and  unexpected (exogenous) increase in corruption
costs, so that for some years corruption seemed to have been defeated
17. Unfortunately,
nowadays the re-emerging of widespread corruption in politcs and bureaucracy is evident,
demostrating the “Italian institutional revolution” was a transitory phenomenon
18.
In term of our model, the Italian experience can be explained by using the idea of institutional
shock. The unespected judicial enquiry produced a strong exogenous increase (shock) in
corruption cost θ  so that  W a B U − < − −θ 1 ; at this point the dominant strategy for all agents
and bureaucrats was honesty. Using the same approach as in Lemma 1 we can show that if all
agents play  2 m  then  0
1 = τ ,  0
2 > τ  for all t and by the dynamic equation of population we have
() ( ). 1
2 τ − − = ∆ z z z , i.e. population monotonically converges to  0 = z .
 Unfortunately, Italy started from a very high level of corruption, that is  1 ≈ z ; thus, as the
shock effects  begun to disappear we probably had again  1 < < t z z . Now, convergence to  0 = z
stops and, by propositions 1 and 2, population moves to  1 = z , with the consequent increase in
corruption levels.
8. Some simple evidence
We can summarize the predictions of the model in three points:
1)  Less developed countries have higher corruption levels.
2)  In general, richer countries must show greater heterogeneity in CPI (corruption perception
Indeces) than poorer countries.
3)  Poorer countries population expects higher levels of corruption in the future.
4)  Given the corruption trap, poorer countries show a higher “stability” of corruption levels.
The first hypothesis is widely documented in literature (see Mauro 1995, Bardhan, 1997 ). We
can confirm it using a cross-country update data-set of Corruption Perception Indices (CPI)
 19
provided by “Transparency international” and comparing them with the level of country
development, using as proxy the pro-capita Gross National Income (GNI).
The source of GNI is the World Bank data set. The indicators of CPI and GNI refer to 92
countries and include the period from 1998 to 2002
20.
Figure 3 shows the relation between the level of corrupion and country development
(measured by GNI); it is evident a positive relation (point 1). Moreover, the Plot seems to
confirm the second hypothesis that more developed countries can show either high or low levels
                                                          
17This evident reduction in corruption levels was strictly connected to the reduction of corruption
opportunities (for example by interruption of tenders) and to the extreme fear diffused among officials,
bureaucrats and politicians.
18 Newspapers daily report cases of growing corruption in bureaucracy, procurement and public services.
Informations on renewed corruption in Italy is avoilable on the web page www.transparency.it.
19 Higher values of CPI mean lower levels of corruption.
20 With CPI98/02 and GNI98/02 are indicated the simple mean of both CPI and GNI on the period from
1998 to 2002.15
of corruption. Observing the sample we note a significant number of developed countries with
high levels of corruption but not the reverse; very important examples are Italy, Greece, South
Korea, Spain. These countries have relatively high level of GNI pro-capita but a low corruption
index (that is a high corruption); on the other hand, poorer countries always converge to a high
level of corruption (low level of CPI index). Infact, observing the plot, less developed countries
present a relevant “concentration” around low values of CPI while we have a higher variance in
CPI indicators for richer countries. With poorer countries we intend those with an average GNI
of less than 3000. This allows us to divide the sample in 46 poor countries and 46 rich countries:
the variance of the average CPI for poorer and richer countries is respectively 0,75 and 4,5. As
was expected, richer countries show a higher “dispersion” around the mean CPI while the
evident poorer countries corruption index stability seems to confirm our hypothesis of “the
corruption trap” (point 4).
Again,  Transparency International provides cross-country data on population expectations
about  future level of corruption
21. We can use them to verify the third prediction of the model.
The second plot (figure 4) compares the percentage of population expecting a higher level of
corruption in the future (lot02) with the level of GNI pro-capita (data are avoilable only for 2002
and for 43 countries). This simple evidence reveals a negative relation between corruption
expectations and level of development, as our model predicts. For more details see “
Transparency international global corruption barometer” on the official web-page of
Transparency International.
                                                          
21 Data are avoilable consulting the “Transparency international global corruption barometer” on the
official web-page of  Transparency International, www.transparency.org.16




















Figure 3- Development and Corruption
Source: Transparency International and World Bank














Figure 4 - Development and Expectations
Source: Transparency International and World Bank17
9. Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed how social preferences interacts with both the choice of institutions
and levels of bureaucratic corruption. By a bureaucratic game we model the behaviour of
different types of agents. Their choices are crucially affected by the level of corruption costs
fixed in each period by a simple direct majority voting mechanism. Given the general
hypothesis of a “tragic perception” of bureaucratic costs, we identify two possible equilibria of
bureaucratic game: 1) a pooling equilibrium with all types of agents manifesting scarce aversion
to corruption, and so allowing bureaucrat to practise corruption in all transaction; 2)  a
separating equilibrium with corruption when the agent is corrupt and honesty with honest
agents.
However, a third equilibrium, with all types of agents choosing honesty, is possible if we
remove the hypothesis on the perceived level of bureaucratic cost. We consider this can occurs
through an exogenous institutional shock consisting in a temporary strong increase in corruption
costs. The Italian experience of “mani pulite” seems to confirm this approach.
Each equilibrium produces different dynamics in the evolution of social preferences: 1)
convergence to a completely corrupt society when all types of agents prefer corruption (pooling
equilibrium). This occurs because only corrupt agents exert a positive education effort; 2)
convergence to a mixed distribution of preferences if the equilibrium is separating. In this case
all agents exert positive education efforts, favouring the convergence to an internal steady state.
 According to the “position” of the internal steady state we can distinguish between typical
situations of underdevelopment from that of developed countries. This because we hypothesize
that in developed economies agents have a weaker perception of bureaucratic costs, inducing
lower education efforts of corrupt parents. Relevant are the implications in terms of
anticorruption policies. In developed countries, public education campaigns produce efficacious
results, premanently reducing the level of corruption. Moreover, if the proportion of corrupt
agents is sufficiently low we have self-fulfilling equilibria; then optimistic agents’ expectations
can positively affect the future composition of social preferences, producing an effective
reduction in both the number of corrupt agents and corruption costs (institutional change).
On the other hand, if we consider an underdeveloped country, corruption appears as a
permanent state. Optimistic expectations can not emerge spontaneously and the only relevant
anticorruption intervention consists in public education campaigns. However, also in this case,
we simply obtain a temporary reduction of corruption. This situation is called “corruption trap”.
 To definitively solve the problem we have to reduce the agent perception of bureaucratic
costs; this means we must create conditions for economic development. Simple empirical
evidence seems to confirm our hypothesis about the relationship between corruption and
development.
 In particular, the corryption indices for poorer countries show both a strong stability along
time and a “significant” concentration around lower levels: this fact could be explained by the
existence of “the corruption trap” which prevents efficient reforms and reduces the population
aversion to corruption.18
Appendix
 First we have to show that when  2 θ θ=
e  then 
* z  is the unique stable steady-state of
population. Considering the dynamic equation of population  () ( )
2 1
1 1 t t t t t t z z z z τ τ− − + = +  we
note that it has three rest points: i)  0 = z , ii)  1 = z  and iii) 
* z z = with 
2 1 τ τ = .
Deriving the dynamic equation with respect to  t z  we obtain
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   given that  () ( ) 0 1
1 = ⇒ =τ t z
then points  0 = z  and  1 = z  are not stable.
To evaluate the stability of point 
* z , rewrite the derivative of dynamic equation as

























































































Evaluating this derivative in 
∗ = z zt , that is considering 
2 1 τ τ =  and given  C C ′ ′ < ′ τ ∀  we
have
()
() () 1 , 0 1






















 and conclude that  
∗ = z zt   is locally stable. ■
Following the same arguments we can show that with  1 θ θ=
e  the unique stable steady state is
1 = z . Infact, given  0
2 = τ , the dynamic equation becomes  () ( )
1







1 1 − + =
∂
∂ + τ  and  () () 1 , 0 1
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. Conversely, the other rest point  0 = z is not
stable, given that  () 1 1
1
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Proposition 1: we subdivide the proof of proposition 1 in four parts:
Proof A: Suppose that  2
1 * < z ,  2
1
0 > z  and  2 θ θ=
e . By Lemma 1 ( ) 0








(population converges to 




1 < = + t t z z . Then there exists a  2
1 > z  such
that for all  z zt >  we have  () 2
1
1 > + t t z z . Moreover,  z zt <  implies  () 2
1
1 < + t t z z .
Proof B: Suppose that  2
1 * < z ,  2
1
0 < z  and  1 θ θ=
e . By Lemma 1  0
1 > τ ,  0













1 > = + t t z z . Then there exists a
2
1 ˆ < z  such that for all  2
1 ˆ < < t z z  we have  () 2
1
1 > + t t z z . Moreover,  z zt ˆ <  implies  () 2
1
1 < + t t z z .
Proofs A and B prove 2). ■
Proof C: Suppose that  z z ˆ 0 < and  z z ˆ
* < ; even if  1 θ θ=
e  we have  2
1
1 ) ( < + t t z z  then the
unique reasonable expectation is  2 θ θ =
e  and population converges to 
* z ; by the same
arguments, if  2
1 * ˆ < < z z  and  z zt ˆ < , population tends converge to 
* z : however, for  t z close
enough to 
* z , we will have  2
1 ˆ < < t z z  falling within the case analyzed in proof B.
 Proof C proves 3) and 4). ■
Proof D: Suppose that  2
1
0 > > z z ; also with  2 θ θ=
e  we have  2
1
1 ) ( > + t t z z , then the unique
reasonble expectation is  1 θ θ =
e  and population converges to 1.
Proof D proves 1). ■
Proposition 2 (corruption trap): When  2
1
0 < z ,  t z  increases towards  2
1 * > z  or  1 = z
according to the expected θ . Then population will reach a  t z  such that  2
1
1 ) ( > + t t z z  for all t; at
that point the unique reasonable expectation is 1 θ θ=
e  and population will converge to  1 = z .
By the same arguments, when  2
1
0 > z  , 
1
2 > t z  for all t and population will converge to  1 = z . ■
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